Abstract: Based on the advances in laptop technologies and the mobility characteristics, laptops have become a vital device used at various places. Usually, numerous sensitive files such as credit card numbers and Web cookies are stored on laptops for convenient usage. However, if a laptop is stolen, the data stored on it is easily leaked; which may cause serious consequences. Encrypting files by encryption keys is a general solution; however, if the decryption keys are also stored on laptops, the files can also be decrypted by adversaries easily. To solve this problem, this paper proposes the Mobile Encryption for Laptop data Protection (MELP) system. MELP includes the design of an online server and mobile phone, and encrypts each sensitive file by a file system encryption key, which is further sequentially encrypted twice by the phone's and server's encryption keys. The reason of adopting a mobile phone is that at least one simple confirmation of execution must be performed by a user, and the reason of adopting an online server is that if both user's laptop and mobile phone are stolen, users can still disable the online decryption process on the server.
Introduction
As a benefit from the high-speed computation, large storage and mobility characteristics of laptops, numerous people tend to store their sensitive data on personal laptops at various places. Examples of sensitive data include (i) browser cookies that remember the login credentials or even credit card numbers for financial, shopping and social network sites, (ii) personal email stored in e-mail client applications, (iii) chat histories stored in instant messaging applications and (iv) personal photos. Moreover, enterprise employees or managers usually store more sensitive business secrets on their laptops such as financial, operational records or trade secrets of their companies. Owing to the mobility characteristic, laptops are easily stolen or lost. Given the vast amount of secrets stored on personal laptops, data leakage because of lost or stolen laptops constitutes a major threat to both individuals and enterprises [1 -3] . The destructive consequence of the exposure of confidential data because of lost/stolen laptops warrants the pursuit of a secure and easy-to-use solution to protect the privacy and secrecy of laptop data. The scheme must be resilient to dictionary attacks and password recovery. Right after the loss of a laptop, the secret files on the laptop must be automatically encrypted without user effort and instantly become inaccessible to a thief. Moreover, even if both the laptop and key-storing device are stolen, the user must still be able to disable the process of laptop data decryption.
Regrettably, existing solutions for protecting laptop data privacy and secrecy have several drawbacks. For example, the password-based file protection or disk encryption incurs poor security since users tend to choose low-entropy passwords (e.g. '123456') that can be easily reconstructed via dictionary attacks. Furthermore, the USB key-based data encryption mechanism causes the usability problem because the user must bring one more additional hardware equipment for each laptop. The recently proposed mobile user location-specific encryption (MULE) [4] system automatically decrypts the sensitive laptop data only at a pre-specified trusted location, and transparently re-encrypts the data outside the trusted location. Data decryption key is automatically transmitted by the device deployed at this location so that the data can be decrypted without passwords entered. However, MULE still hampers usability because it restricts the use of sensitive data only at a specific trusted location, whereas at other locations the users must enter their passwords. Moreover, trusted platform module (TPM) hardware is required to be supported on the laptop in MULE; however, TPM hardware has not been supported by most laptops. Another solution is the keypad [5] system, which encrypts laptop data and stores the decryption key on a Web server. Each time a file is being accessed, the laptop automatically triggers the Web server to transmit the corresponding decryption key back; therefore the Web server can exactly log which files have been accessed. However, once a laptop is stolen, the thief can still access the files via the automatic decryption process; in other words, keypad focused on auditing more than security.
This paper proposes the mobile encryption for laptop data protection (MELP) system, which utilises mobile phones for protecting the sensitive data on laptops. The critical data on a laptop is encrypted with a file system protection key, which is further encrypted twice with two encryption keys. These two decryption keys are stored on a mobile phone and an online server, respectively. Accessing the secret files on laptop requires the decryption of file system protection key by both the two corresponding decryption keys stored on the smart phone and server; it is performed automatically with little user interference. After the file system protection key is decrypted, it is transmitted from mobile phone to laptop via a 'constrained communication channel' [e.g. via a twodimensional (2D) bar code or Bluetooth]; this constrained channel can only be established within a short distance between mobile phone and laptop. In this manner, if the laptop is stolen but the mobile phone is not, the constrained communication channel is automatically broken. This paper contains eight sections. In Section 2, we introduce several related works of MELP. The system assumptions of MELP are defined in Section 3. The overview and details of MELP are described in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. We discuss the security analysis in Section 6. System implementation issues and evaluations are presented in Section 7. Finally, we present our conclusion and discuss future work in Section 8.
Related work

Stolen laptop problem
As people tend to store sensitive data on laptops for convenience, secrets are possible to be leaked if laptops are stolen. Encrypting files or the file system of laptop is a common solution to solve the stolen laptop problem [1 -3] . In general, the encryption keys are generated based on two kinds of information: user password [6 -8] and large random value [9 -11] . In the case of using passwords provided by users, since these passwords are usually selected to be remembered easily, they are easy to be reconstructed by dictionary attack. By contrast, in the case of using a large random value, since it is too complicated to be remembered, it must be maintained by a system or stored on a digital storage. Studer and Perrig [4] proposed the MULE system, which encrypted and decrypted laptop data based on the location factor. In MULE, the decryption key is transferred from a trusted location device deployed at a trusted location through a constrained channel, such as infrared (IR) LED. If the laptop is not located at the trusted location, it cannot receive the key since the constrained channel cannot be established; thus the decryption process fails. However, in this manner, users can only access their secret data at some specific locations. In order to support mobile usage, the MULE system also protects the decryption key with the TPM hardware equipped on laptop. However, since TPM hardware has not been supported by most laptops until now, this solution is not applicable for most users. Corner and Noble [12] proposed the zerointeraction authentication (ZIA) system, which encapsulated the decryption key into a token and stored this token onto a wearable device such as IBM Linux watch. However, this kind of wearable device also has not been popular until now.
Device paring and constrained channel
In systems such as ZIA [12] , the laptop is usually required to be paired or bound to a mobile device for establishing a communication channel. Wireless technologies such as IEEE 802.11 or Bluetooth are usually adopted so that the communication channel can be constructed automatically without user's intervention. Both the MULE and ZIA systems emphasised that this channel must be a short-range or constrained channel for preventing the transmitted information from being eavesdropped. Constrained channels can be constructed by various technologies with distinct properties. IR LED is not supported by most mobile devices; thus, it is not applicable for the mobile scenario. Bluetooth and other wireless technologies provide the capability of zero user intervention, but in this manner, the constrained channel can be established without owner's awareness. Near-field communication (NFC) [13 -15] is a new technology, which enables mobile devices to establish a short-range wireless and contactless communication channel. If NFC is deployed on mobile phones, users can also use it for conducting authentication based on the SIM cards. The wireless channel established based on NFC is a very secure constrained channel, because that it provides a very short range (,0.2 m) of communication; in the case of laptop protection, the attacker must be very close to the laptop to access this channel if the laptop has not been stolen, it is easily noted by the laptop's owner. However, most laptops have not supported NFC yet until now.
2D barcode and quick response code
Compared with 1D barcode, 2D barcode [16 -18] is able to store more information within an image for information exchange. The channel between 2D barcode displayer and scanner is a constrained channel, since that if images are taken with longer distance, they become smaller, more ambiguous and more difficult to be decoded correctly. This kind of constrained channel requires users to perform a simple action: locate the scanner and displayer together. In this manner, the establishment of this channel can be confirmed by users with little user intervention. Quick response (QR) code [19 -21] is a kind of 2D barcode proposed in 1994; it is designed for encoding and decoding data between text contents and images rapidly. QR code is an easily used technology to store information such as URL of Web site, phone number and e-mail address. In numeric format, the max size of QR code message can be up to 7089 characters; in binary format, the maximum amount is 2953 bytes. QR code also supports error correction for fault tolerance. Fault tolerance is a crucial feature since that perfect photographing cannot be guaranteed. With the fault tolerance feature, users do not have to try multiple times for decoding the captured images with few errors. In recent years, since the QR code technology has been supported by numerous mobile phones such as Android phones, it has been widely adopted in various mobile applications, and most mobile users are already familiar with using it.
TPM-based data protection
TPM [22 -24] is a hardware device or specification, which offers multiple security facilities such as secures the generation of cryptographic keys, secures the usage of these keys and generates of hardware-based pseudo-random number. TPM can protect sensitive data on laptops simply by sealing the data with a non-migratable TPM storage key. However, this solution is not feasible so far because TPM chip has not been supported by most laptops. In addition, another problem of TPM hardware is that it only protects the cryptography keys, but not the secret data directly. If secret data are decrypted and stored into memory temporarily, it may be stolen by a malicious program. To solve this problem, our previous work, TrustVisor [25] , was proposed. TrustVisor leveraged the hypervisor [26 -28] and TPM technologies to provide code integrity, data integrity and data secrecy for selected portions of an application. In this manner, the execution of using secret data can be isolated from malware.
System assumptions
To define the scope of MELP, several assumptions are defined. Four main parties are included in MELP: mobile phone, laptop, TPM server and flash drive. One user account can be associated with only one mobile phone but multiple laptops. On each laptop, the secret files are encrypted by a symmetric encryption key; attackers cannot access the secret files without possessing the file system root key. To make MELP applicable on most of the laptop products, MELP does not rely on the TPM mechanism on laptops; therefore we do not assume that TPM hardware is supported on the laptop. In addition, the laptop is possible to be stolen, but no malware is installed on it before it is stolen; otherwise, the attacker can easily obtain the file system root key when it is decrypted by the user. On the TPM server side, we assume that the OS of TPM server is compromisable, but the TPM hardware, the hypervisor and the software module which is protected by both the TPM and hypervisor, is not. The security issues of TPM hardware, hypervisor and the software module protected by them, are out of scope of this paper. Moreover, the organisation which maintains the TPM server must already have a PKI, kEK t , DK t l, to use, and the public key EK t is included directly into the laptop and mobile phone applications. Since numerous researches [29 -31] have proposed various revocation mechanisms for PKI, such as creating certificates via CA, this paper does not focus on this issue. On the mobile phone side, we assume that the mobile phone is possible to be stolen, but it is more difficult to steal both laptop and phone than only the laptop. Also, no malware is installed on the mobile phone before it is stolen; otherwise, the attacker can obtain the phone decryption key without stealing the phone. In addition, users can choose an optional backup mechanism by using their flash drives and flash drive passwords in case that they forget to bring their phones or want to access secret files offline. In this case, the flash drive maintains copies of phone decryption key as well as server decryption key, and plays the role as a representative of both mobile phone and TPM server. We assume that the flash drive may be stolen, but the thief does not know the flash drive password. However, this design provides more usability than security, because the thief may perform dictionary attack to discover the flash drive password. Therefore users have to take the risk if they really want to create backups on flash drives. Finally, we assume that RSA is not compromisable, and use RSA in most encryption and decryption operations of MELP.
Overview
The overview of MELP is shown in Fig. 1 . In this figure, the golden key is a symmetric key; the red, blue and black keys represent the private key parts of asymmetric key pairs, and the red, blue and black locks represent the public key parts of asymmetric key pairs. To protect secret files on laptop, the golden file system root key is generated by the laptop application to encrypt these files. The file system root key is further encrypted by the black phone lock and blue server lock sequentially, and the original copy of file system root key is deleted thereafter. Therefore in the online decryption scenario, only when all the parties of laptop, mobile phone and TPM server (or their representatives) participate in the decryption process, the secret files on laptop can be accessed. The black and blue key-lock pairs are initially generated and distributed by the mobile application during the phone registration process.
Whenever the user wants to access the secret files on laptop, the laptop application sends the twice-encrypted result of golden key blinded by a random blinding factor to TPM server for the first-round decryption. After receiving the first-round decryption result, the laptop application blinds it with another blinding factor, sends the result to TPM server again, and asks the user to execute mobile application for second-round decryption. Then, the phone application acquires the secondly blinded result five from TPM server and decrypts it by phone decryption key. Finally, the phone application sends back the decryption result to the laptop application via a constrained channel. In this manner, user can access the secret files based on the existence of the registered laptop and mobile phone, online service of TPM server and constrained channel, with little user intervention. In other words, if any one of these factors is absent, the secret files cannot be stolen.
In addition to the basic decryption scenario, users can choose an optional backup mechanism to access secret files offline. The backup on flash drive is created by acquiring the phone decryption key as well as server decryption key and then encrypting them by the yellow flash drive password as well as the red laptop decryption key. In other words, only the person who possesses the flash drive, the laptop and the flash drive password can access the secret files stored on laptop.
MELP details
Initialisation phase
During the deployment of MELP, several initialisation steps must be conducted. First of all, the MELP TPM server must select a K s , which is a symmetric key for protecting all the secrets on it. All the functionalities of the TPM server must be implemented within a software module, SM, which is protected by a hypervisor, HP, which is further protected by the TPM hardware. The SM maintains a public/private key pair kEK t , DK t l for protecting messages in communications established with mobile phones or laptops, and then encrypts the secret DK t by K s , into Etpm ¼ Ea(EK t , K s ); here the function Ea is an asymmetric encryption function. The public key EK t is included into the distributions of mobile applications and laptop applications, so that these applications can establish secure channels with the TPM server. Finally, the SM encrypts the K s with the assistance of HP by executing the binding function of TPM, and then deletes DK t as well as K s .
On the user side, users must download the mobile applications and laptop applications from the Android market and trusted Web sites, respectively. At the first time when the laptop application is executed, a symmetric key K file is generated for protecting the data which users want to protect. Also, a pair of public/private keys kEK l , DK l l of laptop is created for protecting and signing messages. At the first time when the mobile application is executed, two pairs of public/private keys kEK s , DK s l and kEK m , DK m l, which are designed to be maintained by the TPM server and the user's mobile phone, respectively, are generated for protecting the K file on laptop. Each key in these two pairs are composed of the exponent part and the modulus part, so that EK s ¼ kes, Nsl, DK s ¼ kds, Nsl, EK m ¼ kem, Nml and DK m ¼ kdm, Nml, where the Nm must be smaller than Ns.
Registration phase
Two kinds of devices are owned by users: mobile phone and laptop, so users must register them first before encrypting or decrypting data on laptop. The registration process is divided into two stages: mobile phone registration and laptop registration, which are shown in Figs. 2 and 3 , respectively. Since we assume that one account can be associated to only one mobile phone but multiple laptops, users can execute the mobile phone registration once but the laptop registration for multiple times for each of their accounts.
Mobile phone registration:
In the beginning of mobile phone registration, the mobile application receives the input of ID (the user's account) and p online (the user's online password) from user. Then, the mobile application generates a registration message m 1 and sends it to the SM on TPM server. In m 1 , R 1 is a random nonce, which makes the encrypted result diverse each time for preventing replay attack, h is a hash function, which prevents the p online from being exposed and the function Ext is an extension function, which ensures that the length of extended hashed result equals to the length of dm. If users do not want to delegate their mobile phone decryption keys dm to TPM server, they can choose not to calculate the Ext(h(p online )) ⊕ dm and include it into e 1 . After sending m 1 , the mobile application deletes ds, p online , h(p online ) and Ext(h(p online )) ⊕ dm.
Once the SM receives the registration message m 1 , it first checks that whether the ID has already been used. If the ID is unused, the SM decrypts e 1 by decrypting K s and Etpm. The SM encrypts several secrets of user into Ep, Eds and Edm for this ID by the symmetric encryption function Es with K s . Ep is designed for user authentication, Eds is for server-side online decryption and Edm is for delegated phone-side decryption or the recovery operation of mobile phone decryption key
Finally, the SM sends back the m 2 message, which includes the registration result and the signature of result. The signature is also used for server authentication; only the server which has the key (DK t ) can sign the result correctly
Laptop registration:
After registering the mobile phones with accounts and online passwords, users can register their laptops by using the same accounts and passwords. First of all, the laptop application sends a laptop registration message m 3 , to the SM according to the ID and p ′ online input by user
After receiving m 3 , the SM extracts EK l and h(p ′ online ) by decrypting K s and Etpm. By comparing h(h(p ′ online )) with the h(h(p online )) decrypted from Ep, this message can be authenticated; if authentication fails, the SM delays retries of this ID. By contrast, if authentication is successful, the SM sends an m 4 message, which includes the result and encryption keys, to the laptop application
After the laptop registration is successful, the laptop application can use the encryption keys in m 4 to encrypt K file into e 3 = (K es−em file mod Nm) mod Ns, and then delete K file . The K file must be deleted completely and all the bits of it must be set to 0 before it is deleted no matter it is stored on disk, RAM or cache to ensure that the attacker cannot obtain the key in any manner if the laptop is stolen. Fig. 4 shows the normal decryption process. Once the laptop application requires K file for decrypting files or encrypting new files, it must decrypt e 3 into K file first. To do so, e 3 must be blinded by a random number R 3 in message m 5 , and sent to the SM. After receiving the decryption message m 5 , the SM verifies the signature of laptop application, decrypts the corresponding Eds into DK s , and creates e 5 by signing e 4 with the signing key DK s . Thereafter, the SM sends back a reply message m 6 to the laptop application After receiving the decryption result coming from SM, the laptop application unblinds e 5 into K es−em−ds file mod Nm, blinds the result with another random number R 4 to create e 6 , and sends the message m 9 to SM
Normal online decryption phase
At this time, the laptop application asks the users to execute their mobile applications and establishes a constrained channel with them. After the mobile applications are executed, they check that whether the e 6 exits on the TPM server by sending a message m 8
If e 6 exists, this means that an ongoing decryption process has not been finished, then the SM forwards e 6 by sending a message m 9 to the mobile application
Finally, the mobile application signs e 6 , and sends the result m 10 to the laptop application via a constrained channel, so that the laptop application can unblind m 10 and obtain the decrypted K file for decrypting or encrypting local files later 
Security analysis
Four parties are included in MELP: mobile phone (M ), laptop (L), TPM server (T ) and flash drive (F ). If any one of {M, L, T, F} is compromised or stolen, the secret files are not disclosed: without possessing laptop, there is no encrypted data to be decrypted; if only laptop is stolen, secret files cannot be decrypted without decryption keys or the online password for accessing the keys. If the attacker tries to use dictionary attack to guess online password, the TPM server performs the delay operation, which is protected by the hypervisor and TPM hardware, and make it infeasible. Similarly, if only {M, T}, {M, F} or {T, F} are controlled, the encrypted secret files are not available. If only {L, F} are stolen, the file cannot be decrypted without knowing the flash drive password. However, if the thief conduct dictionary attack to decrypt the backup on flash drive, the secret files are possible to be disclosed. If only {L, T} are stolen or compromised, the files are still protected by the encryption of phone encryption key. If {M, L} are both stolen, the secret files can be disclosed, because the TPM server responses to requests automatically. However, since mobile phones and laptops are usually vital to people, users can find that they are stolen in a very short period of time, and disable the online decryption service as soon as possible. Also, it is more difficult to steal two devices than only one of them at the same time. As the analysis of three of these parties, the {M, L, T} case is the same as {M, L}, {M, L, F} is the same as {M, L} as well as {M, F}, {M, T, F} is the same as {M}, and {L, T, F} is the same as {L, T} as well as {L, F}. Finally, the {M, L, T, F} case is the same as {M, L} and {L, F}.
During the mobile phone registration phase, messages are basically encrypted by R 1 and EK m , which are further protected by EK t ; therefore attackers cannot obtain the secrets such as ds without knowing DK t . During the laptop registration phase, except the hashed online password, which is protected by EK t , there are no secrets exchanged. In the normal decryption messages, the key K file is always encrypted before the decryption operation on mobile phone. Although it is decrypted and transmitted to the laptop, it is blinded by a blinding factor R 5 and transmitted via a constrained channel, which is not easy to be accessed.
It concludes there are only two cases that the attacker can access the secret files. The first manner is to steal both the laptop and mobile phone, and decrypt the files before the user disable the online decryption service; it is challenging to attackers. The other manner is to steal both the laptop and the backup on flash drive, and then conduct dictionary attack to decrypt the files. Apparently, the former case is more secure than the latter one. Although the users can store the backups on flash keys, and protect it as normal physical keys, they cannot do anything if both the laptop and the backups are stolen. Therefore the backup on flash drive is only an optional choice for users if they care about usability more than security, and users have the responsibility of protecting it.
7 System implementation and evaluation
System implementation
Based on the proposed system design, a system prototype of MELP is implemented. The implementation details are described as follows. First, the TPM server is implemented in C++ and C, and deployed on the Ubuntu 10.10 OS with Intel 2.4 GHz CPU and 4 GB RAM. Second, the laptop application is implemented in Java, C++ and C, and deployed on the Ubuntu 10.10 OS with Intel 2.5 GHz CPU and 4 GB RAM. Moreover, the laptop secret file encryption mechanism is implemented by the EncFS [32] which encrypts the file system with a file system encryption key K file . Third, the mobile application is implemented in Java and deployed on the HTC G1 with Android 1.6 Donut OS. Finally, the constrained channel for sending data from mobile application to laptop application is implemented by displaying an L-mode QR code image and capturing this image from the camera of laptop. Fig. 5 shows the construction of QR code constrained channel. Furthermore, Figs. 6 and 7 show the screenshots of laptop application and mobile application, respectively. Tables 1 -3 evaluate and list the performances of mobile phone registration phase, laptop registration phase and normal decryption phase of MELP, respectively. In the normal decryption phase, the operation of placing the mobile phone in front of laptop's camera is not included, since it highly depends on user's behaviour. In Table 3 , the operation that takes the most of time is displaying an encoded QR code on mobile phone, which is implemented by using the ZXing project [33] . Tables 1 and 2 show that the mobile phone and laptop registration process are very efficient; each of them requires only less than one second for registration. In the normal decryption phase, although the entire process costs about 5 s in average, the ZXing [33] execution spends one-third of the total time. Also, spending 5 s is still acceptable for sensitive data protection.
Performance evaluation
System comparison
The comparison of MELP and many related technologies mentioned in Section 2 are shown in Table 4 . The MULE [4] system focused on data decryption at trusted locations, therefore users cannot use it anywhere. Moreover, the ZIA system focused on the data encryption and decryption scheme rather than the establishment of secure channel. Finally, since all the other solutions require the specific client device or hardware module, only MELP is applicable to be executed on popular laptops and mobile phones until now.
Conclusion and future work
In conclusion, laptop theft is a serious problem. Even if the sensitive data stored on a laptop is protected by a password, most passwords are relatively easy to be discovered by dictionary attacks. Although data can be encrypted by users, the leakage problem still exists if the decryption key is also stored on laptop. To solve this problem, MELP includes the user's mobile phone to ensure that users are aware of the construction of constrained channel during decryption [12] no not specified no NFC [13] [14] [15] processes. Also, a TPM server, which is protected by a hypervisor and TPM hardware, is adopted so that if both the laptop and mobile phone are stolen, users can still disable the online decryption process on the server. Moreover, a constrained channel implemented by displaying and capturing a QR code is designed so that users can decrypt their files conveniently and securely. Finally, the security of MELP is analyzed and the performance of it is evaluated. As NFC technology has not been supported by laptops, we currently adopt QR code images and cameras to implement the constrained channel. In the future, we will replace the QR code with NFC technology once NFC is supported on most laptops or even PCs. In this manner, the constrained channel can be constructed more easily and the usability would be improved.
